This research discusses about the roles of institutional ownership and leverage as control mechanism over agency conflict and how it affects corporate performance. Agency conflict is a result of expropriation via tunneling on asset utilization. This study uses panel data with a sample of 136 companies in Indonesia between 2001-2012. Simultaneous model testing using Three Stage Least Square estimation technique is also used in this study. Results suggest that institutional ownership and leverage have a non-linear effect on asset utilization. Institutional ownership can be used as a control mechanism at higher levels of ownership. However, when the ownership surpasses certain level, institutional owners will be able to conduct expropriation through tunneling. Low-level leverage will result in expropriation through tunneling by institutional owners. On the other hand, higher level of leverage makes it possible to use leverage as control mechanism. This study also suggests that there is a substitutional correlation between the implementation of control mechanism and leverage. This research also proves that the effect of control mechanism on asset utilization will improve corporate performance. This research does not specifically investigate the proportions of institutional ownership and leverage as borderline threshold which shows that the two variables can be used as control mechanism. It also implies that the control mechanism over agency conflict which happens as a result of expropriation through tunneling can be done using institutional ownership and leverage. Institutional ownership and leverage must, in this case, be conducted properly towards asset utilization so that it can improve corporate performance. This research provides evidence and solutions for agency conflicts that happen as a result of expropriation through tunneling. This study also contributes to the agency theory testing model by using simultaneous equation and considering non-linear testing method.
This research discusses about the roles of institutional ownership and leverage as control mechanism over agency conflict and how it affects corporate performance. Agency conflict is a result of expropriation via tunneling on asset utilization. This study uses panel data with a sample of 136 companies in Indonesia between [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Simultaneous model testing using Three Stage Least Square estimation technique is also used in this study. Results suggest that institutional ownership and leverage have a non-linear effect on asset utilization. Institutional ownership can be used as a control mechanism at higher levels of ownership. However, when the ownership surpasses certain level, institutional owners will be able to conduct expropriation through tunneling. Low-level leverage will result in expropriation through tunneling by institutional owners. On the other hand, higher level of leverage makes it possible to use leverage as control mechanism. This study also suggests that there is a substitutional correlation between the implementation of control mechanism and leverage. This research also proves that the effect of control mechanism on asset utilization will improve corporate performance. This research does not specifically investigate the proportions of institutional ownership and leverage as borderline threshold which shows that the two variables can be used as control mechanism. It also implies that the control mechanism over agency conflict which happens as a result of expropriation through tunneling can be done using institutional ownership and leverage. Institutional ownership and leverage must, in this case, be conducted properly towards asset utilization so that it can improve corporate performance. This research provides evidence and solutions for agency conflicts that happen as a result of expropriation through tunneling. This study also contributes to the agency theory testing model by using simultaneous equation and considering non-linear testing method.
INTRODUCTION
as independent variables. They found out that insitutional ownership acted as a substitute for managerial ownership and leverage in controlling agency conflict. Additionally, Chen and Steiner (1999) suggest that institutional ownership and managerial ownership had a substitutional effect on agency conflict control. Based on the empirical research, this study will use institutional ownership and leverage as control mechanism over agency conflict that happens as a result of asset utilization.
This study specifically examines the asset utilization managed by corporates. Several studies suggest a decline in company value during the announcement of tunneling-indicated related party transactions Stouraitis, 2006 and Cheung, Qi, and ). Jian and Wong (2010) discovered that corporates performed tunneling by making receivables transaction with related parties to transfer the companies' outgoing resources. Furthermore, Cheung, Jing, Lu, and Rau (2009) found an empirical evidence that sales transactions and asset purchases from related parties were used to perform tunneling. On the other hand, Aharony et al., (2005) discovered that receivables transaction against related parties indicated tunneling after IPO (Initial Public Offering). Therefore, the objectives of this study are to examine: (1) institutional ownership as control mechanism over asset utilization, (2) leverage as control mechanism over asset utilization, (3) interdependence relationship between institutional ownership and leverage in performing control mechanism towards asset utilization, (4) the influence of asset utilization on corporate performance, (5) institutional ownership as control mechanism over corporate performance, and (6) leverage as control mechanism over corporate performance.
Institutional Ownership and Asset Utilization
The ability to exercise control can be different for different levels of ownership. Unlike lower institutional ownership level, higher level of institutional ownership means a more effective managerial control. Bukart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) reinforced this with a suggestion that ownership level provides incentives for owners to monitor managerial behaviours in a more effective way. On the other hand, Iskandar et al., (2012) suggest that concentrated ownership can effectively increase the efficiency of asset utilization. A study conducted by Iturriaga and Crisostomo (2010) suggests a bell-shaped relationship between majority shareholders and corporate value. The active monitoring process conducted by the majority shareholders brings a positive result on corporate value. However, due to the increase in ownership level, majority shareholders tend to perform expropriation on minority shareholders.
This action then affects corporate value negatively.
Based on this empirical evidence, there is a tradeoff between monitoring effect through institutional ownership and asset utilization. It can also be said that the effect of expropriation through tunneling over asset utilization is a result of the behavioral change of institutional shareholders on different ownership levels. Based on that explanation, the research hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H1: The influence of institutional ownership on asset utilization is positive when institutional ownership level is low and negative when institutional ownership level is high.
Leverage and Asset Utilization
Leverage works as an alternative way of transferring monitoring expenses from owners to lenders. Leverage should also encourage managers to be more disciplined in order to avoid bankruptcy. A research conducted by Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) suggests that leverage increases the decision making ability of the management. Additionally, Friend and Lang (1988) discovered that leverage could be used to reduce agency conflict by using external parties to oversee the management. Ade (2008) found a positive relationship between the external monitoring process conducted by banks as lenders towards total asset turnover. Based on that empirical evidence, it can be concluded that when leverage is low, the effect of control mechanism on asset utilization is low, whereas when leverage is high, the effect of control mechanism on asset utilization becomes stronger. The reason for this is because leverage is used to control the behaviour of institutional shareholders who perform expropriation through tunneling towards asset utilization. Th said action can bring loss to banks or lenders which lend money to the company. Based on this explanation, the hypothesis of this research can be formulated as follows:
H2: The influence of leverage on asset utilization is negative when leverage level is low and positive when leverage level is high.
Institutional Ownership and Leverage
Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) discovered that leverage and dividends were complementarily used to reduce agency costs but failed to prove that insider ownership was a substitution for leverage and dividends in controlling agency costs. Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994) (Atasanov et al., 2007) . Meanwhile, asset purchases from related parties at higher value than reasonable price (tunneling in) would result in a decrease in corporate profitability (Atasanov et al., 2007) . Therefore, the increase in asset utilization will go in line with the increase in corporate performance as a result of the implementation of control mechanism through institutional ownership and leverage. Some research studies, including Wang, (2010) and Pouraghajan et al., (2013) Crutchley et al., (1999) reveal that institutional owners possess a more superior ability in management control than individual owners. Furthermore, Thomsen (2004) suggests that a concentrated ownership structure from majority shareholders has a non-linear correlation with corporate value. This means that when concentrated ownership structure is low, corporate value decreases. On the other hand, when the concentrated ownership structure is high, shareholders will hold internalization to protect their investments in the company. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) and Perrini et al, (2008) found that more concentrated ownership structure has a positive effect on the profitability of the company. Hu and Izumida (2008) In other words, 59.68% of the company's total leverage is funded by the company's total assets. Table 5 LEVERAGE (leverage) = total leverage / total asset; LEVERAGE2 = squared total debt / total assets; ASSET_UT (asset utilization) = total sales / total assets; MBVA = equity market price / asset Table 6 contains the test result of simultaneous equation model. Table 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Institutional Ownership and Asset Utilization
The test result of simultaneous equation model using the Three Stage Least Square estimation technique in Table 6 shows that the variable coefficient of institutional ownership is at a low level (β 21 = 2.1845) with a positive sign and a significance level of 10%, whereas at a higher level 
Leverage and Asset Utilization
The test result of simultaneous equation model using the Three Stage Least Square estimation technique in Table 6 shows that the variable coefficient of leverage is at a low level (β 22 = -0.3989) with a negative sign and a significance level of 1%, whereas at a higher level (γ 22 = 0.0238), it shows a positive sign and a significance level of 10%. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is proven.
When leverage is low, creditors or banks perform a relatively low monitoring function in the company. This brings a negative effect towards asset utilization because institutional shareholders can conduct expropriation through tunneling on creditors or banks which will lead to the decline in asset utilization. However, when leverage is high, creditors or banks obtain almost all control in asset utilization and this condition may result in the reduction in expropriation by means of tunneling. Friend and Lang (1988) discovered that leverage could be used to reduce agency conflict by inviting external parties to supervise the management.
The applied leverage can also serve as a control system for the company by using banks or creditors to optimize asset utilization and improve corporate performance. Ade (2008) suggested a positive relationship between external monitoring by banks and total asset turnover. This shows that leverage can be used to control asset utilization.
When leverage is high, banks or creditors will be more strict with their monitoring function. As a result, asset utilization will increase. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a trade-off between control mechanism effects via asset utilization monitoring and agency conflict effects via asset utilization tunneling at high leverage level. This condition can be seen in Picture 3.
Institutional Ownership and Leverage
The test result of simultaneous equation model using the Three Stage Least Square estimation technique in Table 6 shows that the variable Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) believe that institutional ownership can be used as a substitute for managerial ownership and leverage. Likewise, Chen and Steiner (1999) also suggest that leverage, managerial ownership, dividends, and risks have substitutional effects. In addition, they also found out that institutional ownership and managerial ownership had a substitutional relationship.
Finally, Crutchley et al., (1999) also discovered a substitutional relationship between ownership structure and leverages or dividends.
Asset Utilization and Corporate Performance
The test result of simultaneous equation model using the Three Stage Least Square estimation technique in Table 6 shows that the variable 
Institutional Ownership and Corporate
Performance
The test result of simultaneous equation model using the Three Stage Least Square estimation technique in Table 6 shows that the variable coefficient of institutional ownership at lower level performance and suggest that when ownership is low, the effect is negative and when it is high, the effect is positive.
Leverage and Corporate Performance
The test result of simultaneous equation model using the Three Stage Least Square estimation technique in Table 6 shows that the variable coefficient of leverage at lower level (β 13 = 2.1356) is positive with a significance level of 1%, whereas at higher level (γ 12 = -0.0948), it shows negative sign and is considered to be insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is not proven. Finally, this research also provides an implication for capital market regulation and suggests that it should improve the monitoring on information related to related-party transactions (tunneling) investors need to prevent loss.
CONCLUSION
Control mechanism via institutional ownership on asset utilization is more dominant at higher levels.
Therefore, it brings positive and significant effects. 
